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Germany is moving towards a multi-pillar pension system. Most economists and politicians
have accepted, some reluctantly, that the pressures on the pure pay-as-you-go system caused
by population aging must be alleviated by introducing a pre-funded component. The pension
reform enacted in 2001, sometimes referred to as the “Riester reform” in the public debate, is
an important step in that direction. Until the year 2000, pension reforms in Germany have
been of the parametric type, changing some features of the pay-as-you-go pension system, but
avoiding more radical measures. Germany’s 2001 pension reform is more fundamental be-
cause for the first time after the pay-as-you-go-system was introduced in 1957
1, a funded
component has officially been added to the public pension system.
2
There is no need to repeat the arguments for (and against) fundamental pension reform. The
interested reader is referred to Raffelhüschen (1993), Buslei and Kraus (1996), Börsch-Supan
(1998, 2000, 2002), Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1998), Sinn (1999) and Rürup (2000) for dif-
ferent perspectives on the pension crisis in Germany and alternative reform proposals. This
paper concentrates on an important aspect of pension reform that has gained attention rela-
tively late in the pension reform debate in Germany, namely, the capital market effects of
population aging and of a pension reform that involves a shift towards more pre-funding.
3
Population aging has incisive macroeconomic effects which in turn determine capital market
outcomes. Labor supply will be relatively scarce, whereas capital will be relatively abundant.
This will drive up wages relative to the rate of return to capital, reducing households’ incen-
tive to save if the interest elasticity of saving is positive. In addition, some fraction of the
capital stock may become obsolete due to the shrinking labor force and diminishing returns to
scale, making the accumulation of capital even less attractive. In general, these mechanisms
should eventually result in a declining rate of return to capital. An alternative interpretation is
that once the baby-boom generations retire around the year 2030, they start consuming out of
their retirement savings; this will result in capital market outflows, and via declining prices
for financial assets the rate of return will decrease. This is the so-called “asset market melt-
                                               
1 When the public pension system was enacted by Bismarck in 1889, it was fully funded. A partial pay-as-you-
go system was introduced in 1957, and once the system’s funds were depleted in 1969, the system became
purely pay-as-you-go.
2 Schnabel (2001) contains a brief description of the main features of the reform.
3 This paper is a substantially revised version of Börsch-Supan et al. (2000).3
down hypothesis”, see Poterba (2001) for a review. Worries about declining rates of return are
also expressed in the public debate about fundamental pension reform.
To address these concerns, we use a stylized overlapping generations model of pension re-
form to calculate the rate of return to capital over a long horizon, using demographic projec-
tions by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and alternative scenarios. Based on these demo-
graphic projections, we compute the size of the aggregate labor force and analyze the eco-
nomic consequences of two pension reform schemes. As a benchmark, we model the pure
PAYG pension system as it was in place before the 2001 reform and compare the results un-
der this counterfactual system to both the “Riester” reform of 2001 and a more decisive re-
form proposal, the “freezing reform” as suggested in Börsch-Supan (2002). In our benchmark
population and labor force scenario, the comprehensive (or equilibrium) contribution rate
would increase from currently 28 percent to about 42 percent without a fundamental pension
reform.
4 In contrast, the 2001 reform is projected to result in a reduction of the contribution
rate relative to the pure PAYG system of about 2.7 percentage points in 2050. The Riester re-
form will therefore alleviate, but not solve the financing problems of the German pension
system.
The more radical freezing reform scheme assumes that the contribution rate to the public pen-
sion system remains fixed (“frozen”) at its current level in order to insure the long-term vi-
ability of a reduced pay-as-you-go system. Under such a scheme, the replacement rate has to
drop by more than projected by the government for its current reform. This implies also that
households will need to save more for retirement than anticipated by government projections.
Once the large baby-boom generations retire, they start to consume out of their accumulated
retirement savings. Our simulations show quite substantial decreases in the aggregate savings
rate due to population aging (about 9.2 percentage points) and corresponding decreases in the
rate of return to capital of about 0.7 percentage points in 2050. While this is non-negligible,
the word “melt-down” appears exaggerated as a description of this magnitude.
We compare this direct effect of population aging on German capital markets with the effects
of fundamental pension reforms. According to our simulations, the (additional) capital market
effects of the 2001 reform will be only marginal. The more radical “freezing” reform proposal
would have significantly larger capital market effects: In our benchmark scenario, the rate of
                                               
4 This comprehensive rate includes the general tax revenues used to finance the various federal subsidies to the
public pay-as-you-go pension system, see below.4
return to capital would decrease by about 0.5 percentage points. Again, while being non-
negligible, this effect is much less than often claimed in the public debate. Moreover, these
estimates are an upper bound on the rate-of-return effects since our closed-economy model
abstracts from all diversification effects in a world with capital mobility. This is shown by
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2002) in a more stylized overlapping generations model
that allows for capital mobility.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the demographic and
labor force projections and the pension reform schemes that form the background of our
analysis. In section 3, we present a stylized overlapping generations model that evaluates the
effects of population aging and pension reform. Section 4 contains benchmark simulations on
household savings, the capital stock, and the rate of return. In Section 5, we carry out an ex-
tensive sensitivity analysis with respect to our demographic assumptions and the calibration
parameters of the model; this allows to trace out the range of potential capital market effects
of population aging and pension reform. Section 6 concludes.
2. Demographic projections and the implementation of pension reform
It is helpful to begin with some notation that will link demographics, labor force participation,
pension systems and the overlapping generations model. In some instances, noted below, this
notation is more stylized than our actual simulation model.
Demography enters our simulation model via time-specific sizes of the living cohorts in year
t, denoted by Nt,a, where a is age. We include three population groups among Nt,a, workers,
unemployed and pensioners. The economic life of a cohort begins at the age of twenty years,
for which we set a  = 1 and ends with certain death at a = Ω κ , where Ω κ   denotes life-
expectancy of cohort κ  = t-a. Life expectancy corresponds to the underlying demographic
projections. For ease of presentation, we take Nt,a to be total population for a = 1, ..., 80. In
our simulations, we include age and time-specific weights that represent the fraction of the
population that is currently working, unemployed or retired. Age specific labor force partici-
pation and unemployment rates are derived from our labor market scenarios to be described in
more detail below. The fraction of pensioners increases from 0 to 1 over an extended retire-
ment window from age 48 through 80. The time paths of these weights are cohort-specific, re-
flecting shifts in labor supply and retirement behavior. To summarize, ν t,a·Nt,a therefore re-
flects the number of workers, µ t,a·Nt,a the number of unemployed individuals and π t,a·Nt,a the
number of pensioners of age a in time period t.5
To fill this abstract framework with life, we employ long-term projections of the demographic
structure of the German population computed by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
5  We distin-
guish several scenarios for demographic change and stratify these projections along three di-
mensions which together determine population aging: life expectancy, fertility and migration.
Figure 1 summarizes these projections by showing the old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio
of the number of persons aged 65 and older to the number of persons aged 15 to 64) for three
demographic scenarios: (1) weak aging, increasing fertility and strong gains through immi-
gration, (2) modest aging, constant fertility and modest gains through immigration, and (3)
strong aging, constant fertility and weak gains through immigration. The underlying assump-
tions of these scenarios are concisely summarized in tables 1 to 3.
Insert Tables 1 to 3
The demographic projections are augmented by labor force projections based on age and gen-
der specific employment rates. Rather than allowing for endogenous labor supply decisions,
we feed our simulation model with various paths of aggregate employment, again following
Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999). While our scenario-based approach to modeling labor supply
does not allow us to analyze the effects of endogenous labor supply in an aging society, it al-
lows us to analyze labor-supply variations along two dimensions that are only partially mod-
eled in many other models, female labor supply and unemployment. Overall, our labor market
projections comprise the following dimensions: female labor force participation, retirement
age, and unemployment. We combine variations along these dimensions to obtain three labor
force scenarios which can be summarized in the overall labor market participation rate. We
consider (1) almost no increase, (2) a modest increase, and (3) a strong increase in labor force
participation rates. Tables 4 to 6 summarize the assumptions on labor force participation in
these scenarios.
Insert Tables 4 to 6
The declining labor force participation rates after the peak participation age enable us to cal-
culate the number of pensioners in each year.
6  Dividing the number of pensioners by the
number of workers results in an economic dependency ratio of 59.9 percent in 2000 which is
very close to the official figure of 59.7 percent.
                                               
5 In our simulation model we assume that a final steady state is reached in 2200. To achieve this, we make the
simplifying assumption that the population size is constant after 2100, the end date of the demographic projec-
tions by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
6 The details of this procedure are described in Ludwig (2002).6
Figure 2 shows the future evolution of this economic dependency ratio for the entire range of
projections derived from our demographic and labor force scenarios. It combines the most
optimistic population and labor force scenarios (lower curve) with the most pessimistic sce-
narios (upper curve). The figure also shows the combination of the medium population and
the medium labor force scenario. We consider this combination as the most likely develop-
ment and take this as our benchmark scenario for all simulations that follow. The capital mar-
ket consequences of the alternative labor force scenarios will be analyzed in the sensitivity
analysis of section 5. In the benchmark scenario, the old-age dependency ratio flattens after
the year 2035. We therefore take 2035 to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of aging while
we evaluate the effects of pension reform in 2050.
Our next step is to model the pension system. This is complicated by the fact that the German
pension system is linked with the other social protection systems in Germany as well as the
general tax system. The pure pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pillar of the German pension system is
financed by contributions (19.1 percent of gross earnings in 2002) and general tax revenues
(about 9 percent of gross earnings), resulting in a comprehensive contribution rate of about 28
percent of gross earnings. It provides a pension that is approximately proportional to life-time
earnings. The system is much less redistributive than the U.S. social security system and most
other European pension systems. The current net replacement rate, the average net pension in-
come as a fraction of current net labor income, is about 70.4 percent (U.S. social security pro-
vides only about 50 percent).
7 The average retirement age is just 59.5 years, mainly due to an
actuarially unfair pension formula that favors early retirement. In addition to old-age pen-
sions, the system provides a generous disability pension and survivor benefits. Public pen-
sions account for almost 12 percent of GDP, a share two-and-a-half times larger than in the
United States. Börsch-Supan (2000) provides more details on the German pension system and
its current problems.
In addition to the direct contribution rate to the public PAYG pension system, denoted as τ t
PS,
we model contributions to unemployment insurance, τ t
UI, and contributions to health and
long-term care insurance summarized in τ t
H.
  We denote the overall social security contribu-
tion rate, the sum of τ t
UI, τ t
H  and τ t
PS, as τ t
SS. Moreover, taxes on wage income enter our
model via the income tax rate τ t
INC and are used to finance government grants to the pension
                                               
7 Net pension income is gross pension income net of contributions to health and long-term care insurance. In-
come taxes paid by pensioners are not included in this definition because they are usually quite small.7
system and general government consumption. Net wages, indexed by n, are therefore gross
wages, indexed by g, net of the employee’s social security contributions and income taxes.
Since the pension-related government sector is not allowed to issue debt, the budget constraint
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The left hand side of equation (1) describes contributions to the pension system which con-
sists of three elements. The first term captures contributions of the current work force as the
product of the direct contribution rate to the PAYG pension system and aggregate gross wage
income, where the only difference between individual wages is due to age (see section 3.1).
The second term, Zt are government grants to the social security system which are assumed to
be exclusively financed by income taxes and thus implicitly account for indirect contributions
of the current work force. The third term describes contributions of the unemployment insur-
ance system as the product of the direct contribution rate τ t
PS and 80 percent of the aggregate
base for unemployment benefits. We assume that each individual is unemployed for only one
year. Therefore unemployment benefits of each unemployed individual are based on net wage
income during the last working period.
The right hand side of equation (1) describes expenditures of the public pension system, again
consisting of three elements. The first term describes aggregate pension payments which are
the product of the current pension value (the gross pension an average pensioner receives per
month, or per year in our model), denoted by  t φ , times the number of effective pensioners,
a t a t
a
a t N , ,
80
1
, π λ ∑
=
. Here, λ t,a is the weight attached to each pensioner of age a in time period t
which adjusts the pension entitlement of each pensioner relative to the pension entitlement of
an average pensioner who worked for 45 years and earned average income (“Eckrentner”).
The entitlement to pensions of each individual pensioner are determined by her earning
points, which depend on the relative amount of insured income – the sum of gross wage in-
come relative to average wage income over all working periods – and the number of months
(years in our model) contributions were made. The second term, Gt
PS, captures administrative
government expenditures within the pension system. The third term describes aggregate con-
tributions of the social security administration to health and long-term care insurance. The8
base for these contributions is gross pension income of each pensioner. Half of the contribu-
tions are paid by the social security administration and half by the individual pensioner.
We employ three pension scenarios. The first scenario (“pure PAYG”) is a counterfactual
benchmark: In this scenario, we assume that the pre-2001 pay-as-you-go pension system is
maintained without any reform that introduces pre-funding. Accordingly, future benefits are
computed by an adjustment formula referred to as net wage adjustment, and contribution rates
follow from the budget equation (1). The current pension value in this first scenario evolved
according to the recursion




























where AGIt is average gross wage income, NIRt is the net income ratio (the ratio of net to
gross income), and NPBRt is the net pension benefit ratio (the ratio of net to gross pension
benefits). The change in the net income ratio captures the effect of increases in income taxes
and social security contributions. If the aggregate tax burden is higher in year t-1 than in year
t-2, this dampens the increase in the current pension value. The change in the net pension
benefit ratio works in the opposite direction. It amplifies the increase in the current pension
value if the tax burden of pensioners (half of the contributions to health and long-term care in-
surance) increases relative to the tax burden of workers.
The second scenario models the pension system how it is currently projected after the 2001
reform (the so-called “Riester reform”). The objective of the Riester reform is to keep the net
contribution rate below 20 percent until 2020 and below 22 percent until 2030. In order to
achieve this, the recursive equation for the current pension value is replaced by a new adjust-



























where ψ t denotes the share of private retirement provision relative to household income that is
subsidized by the German government. ψ t increases linearly from 0.5 percentage points in
2002 to 4 percentage points in 2009.
8 Since the numerator of the third term in equation (2)
will always be lower than the denominator during this adjustment period, this effectively
dampens the increase of the current pension value in addition to the dampening effect by in-
                                               
8 While the increase in ψ t is 0.5 percentage points each year, the fraction of private retirement provision relative
to income subsidized by the German government increases by 1 percentage point every two years.9
creases in the contribution rate, τ t
PS. After 2009, ψ t remains at the level of 4 percentage points.
Since the factor enters equation (3) with lagged values, its dampening effect will disappear in
2011. Therefore, θ t will be reduced from currently 1 to 0.9 in 2011 which increases the sensi-
tivity of the current pension value to increases in the contribution rate. Note that in contrast to
equation (2), the reformed system described by equation (3) contains only the contribution
rate to the pension system and no other social security contributions or taxes in the new ad-
justment formula. Equation (3) is therefore referred to as modified gross (or net) wage ad-
justment.
Equations (1) and either (2) or (3) determine the evolution of the current pension value over
time. We convert this current pension value into the more prevalent concept of the net re-
placement rate. Note that (1-0.5τ t
H) t φ  is the net pension benefit of an average pensioner
which is just equal to the product of the net replacement rate and average net income of the
current work force. By reducing the current pension value, the Riester reform will therefore
reduce the net replacement rate provided by the pay-as-you-go pillar of the pension system.
9
We do not explicitly model the funded component of the pension system and therefore also do
not account for any savings incentives due to subsidies granted in the Riester reform
scheme.
10 In our model, the funded component consists entirely of voluntary, private savings,
as given by households’ optimal life-cycle decisions.
The third pension scenario (“freezing reform”) fixes the contribution rate to the PAYG pen-
sion system from 2003 onwards at its level in the year 2000 (19.3 percent of gross earnings).
It also freezes the state subsidy Zt in the budget equation (1). Hence, the comprehensive con-
tribution rate remains constant at about 28 percent. As we show in section 4, such a freezing
reform results in much lower replacement rates than the Riester reform scheme and therefore
induces much higher private savings to prepare for retirement.
Both reform schemes result in lower public pensions for future retirees and higher net wages
due to the reduced contribution rates and a higher degree of capital deepening. We assume
that households chose their consumption path in order to maximize their discounted life-time
                                               
9 The official definition by the German government departs from this definition of the replacement rate by also
accounting for the maximum share of private savings. This accounting procedure effectively raises the nominal
replacement rate to higher figures (see Schnabel, 2001). In order to maintain comparability of replacement rates
across the three pension schemes, we apply the replacement rate concept as defined above.
10 While such subsidies would not be neutral in our model, we assume that the savings incentives generated by
these subsidies do not lead the households to “oversave” in the sense that they accumulate more savings than10
utility, given their income path. When the government announces a pension reform scheme,
households anticipate the resulting changes in the income path over the life cycle, re-optimize,
and increase their savings.
11 For both reform schemes, we assume that they are announced in
2001 such that households start to re-optimize in 2002.
The accumulated savings in the funded pillar of both reform scenarios depend on the rate of
return while the pension benefits derived from the PAYG pillar depend on the wage level.
The overlapping generations model described in the following section endogenizes both rate
of return and wage level in a dynamic general equilibrium, taking the dynamics of the popu-
lation age structure and the projections of the labor force as given.
3. Aging and pension reform in a stylized overlapping generations model
Our dynamic macroeconomic model is based on a version of the familiar overlapping genera-
tions model (Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965) introduced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987,
chapter 3). Overlapping generations models have been used extensively to study the effects of
population aging on social security systems. Recent examples include Kotlikoff, Smetters and
Walliser (1999), De Nardi et al. (1999) and Altig et al. (2001) for the United States, Miles
(1999) for Great Britain, and Fehr (1999) and Hirte (2002) for Germany. Miles and Iben
(2000) present a comparative analysis of pension reform schemes for the United Kingdom and
Germany. Kotlikoff (1998) provides an overview of earlier applications of overlapping gen-
erations models. We present the features of the simulation model in section 3.1, followed by a
description of the solution method and the calibration of the model in section 3.2.
3.1 The simulation model
Since the purpose of this paper is to study the effects of a fundamental pension reform on the
rate of return to capital, we focus our analysis on capital market effects. To this end, we take
great care to get the first-order effects of demographic change right by using annual demo-
graphic projections. On the other hand, we do not model the households’ labor supply deci-
sion, since feedback effects created by an endogenous labor supply is of second order to the
capital market consequences of pension reform. While feedback effects of labor supply in the
                                                                                                                                                  
projected by the OLG model. In fact, proponents of the Riester reform argue that one needs the subsidies to ex-
actly reach the equilibrium savings level.
11 There is a recent literature that argues that boundedly rational individuals might not be able to make savings
decisions that allow them to attain their desired levels of retirement wealth (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). We
take up this issue in the conclusions.11
presence of distorting taxes and social security contributions certainly also affect the capital
market, we restrict our attention to households’ life-cycle savings decisions as the primary re-
sponse on the capital market to demographic changes and decreasing public pensions. We
may reiterate, however, that we account for potential unemployment and labor force partici-
pation reactions in our scenario framework described in section 2.
The first cornerstone of our general equilibrium model is the production sector where, given
factor inputs (capital and labor), output and factor prices are determined. The production sec-
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where α  and β  are the factor share and the elasticity of substitution, ε a is age-specific produc-
tivity and At is the aggregate level of labor productivity that grows with a constant rate g. For
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From static profit maximization, we obtain the interest rate as
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where the term in the denominator denotes the employer’s contributions to the social security
system.
In order to determine aggregate consumption, we next consider optimal household behavior
derived from intertemporal utility maximization. By choosing an optimal consumption path,
each generation a maximizes, at any point in time t, the sum of discounted future utility. We
assume that the within-period utility function can be characterized by constant relative risk
aversion, and that preferences are additively separable over time. The objective function of




















where σ  denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ρ  is the discount rate. The plan-
ning horizon of each household in the model is constrained by life expectancy. Maximization
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Here,  a t B ,  is the life-time budget surplus, set to zero since we exclude bequests from our
analysis, ξ t,a are unemployment benefits that amount to 60 percent of last period’s net wage
income, ξ t,a are gross pension benefits as defined above and Wt,a is total wealth of generation
a at time t.
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which reflects households’ trade-off between current and future utility. As in any life-cycle
model, this trade-off is determined by the ratio of the interest rate and the time preference
rate, and by the degree of risk aversion. We determine the life-time consumption paths of all
generations backwards, starting with zero wealth in the final period of life, and then iterating
using the Euler equation. The resulting time paths of consumption determine aggregate saving
and wealth in the household sector. Note that we do not model any form of indirect consump-
tion taxes and capital income taxes. All government consumption in the model is financed by
income taxation.
Finally, two aggregation conditions ensure market clearing and general equilibrium. In all pe-
riods t, we aggregate over the living generations (a = 1, ..., 80). The aggregation equations for
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3.2 Solution method and calibration
We determine the equilibrium path of this overlapping generations model by using the recur-
sive Gauss-Seidel algorithm. It starts with picking an arbitrary initial path for the capital
stock. Since labor supply is exogenous in our model, we solve the static optimization problem
of the representative firm for a given trial value of the capital stock and the labor inputs im-
plied by the demographic projections. We then compute time paths of the factor prices (i.e.,
the wage and interest rates). Given factor prices, we solve the age and time-specific intertem-
poral optimization problems of all cohorts at all points in time, which yields, after aggregat-
ing, time paths of aggregate consumption and savings. Since we operate under the assumption
of a closed economy, aggregate household saving determines the economy’s aggregate capital
stock. This completes the solution for all endogenous variables, given the arbitrary initial
capital stock. This initial capital stock will in general not coincide with the size of the capital
stock that is consistent with household optimization (conditional on factor prices). Hence, we
adjust the initial capital stock and repeat the entire computation recursively until convergence
between the two capital stock paths is achieved. This defines the intertemporal equilibrium of
our dynamic economy.
We start calculations in 1960 and end in 2200 assuming a final steady state. We calibrate the
model with actual demographic data from 1960 to 2000. As an initial condition to determine
the assets of households who already live in 1960, we assume that they behave in 1960 as if
the economy was initially in a steady state.
Since agents in the model are forward looking and since we solve for the saddle path of all
relevant variables from 1960 to 2000 we assume that agents have anticipated all past changes
to the environment, especially those that alter the structure of the public pension system.
While this is a plausible first order approximation for general political reforms and demo-
graphic developments, it is certainly not a good approximation to the German reunification.
We therefore model the reunification as a shock that increases the number of agents but only
marginally increases the capital stock. This results in a decrease in the capital stock per effi-
                                                                                                                                                  
12 German general unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) amount to 60 percent of the last (in our model last
period’s) net wage income for households without children and to 67 percent for households with children. We
simplify by assuming only 60 percent for all households.14
ciency unit – even though aggregate efficiency A also decreases, see below – and a corre-
sponding increase in the rate of return to capital of about 0.2 percentage points. Since the
Vertrag zur deutschen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion was signed in October 1990, we as-
sume that agents re-optimize at the beginning of 1991, taking the new conditions as given.
Since we treat all agents alike, we make an implicit assumption about immigrants by assum-
ing first, that all net migrants of age a in time t have the same amount of assets as natives of
the same age and second, that there are no skill differences between immigrants and natives.
13
Given that we are not interested in the effects of different immigration policies, we consider
these assumptions as good first order approximations. The interested reader it referred to
Bonin et al. (2000), Razin and Sadka (1999), and Storesletten (2000) as examples of studies
that analyze the interactions between migration and fiscal policy.
For the simulations, we set τ t
PS 
 to the actual value of 0.193 in 2000, the beginning year of our
calculations. The contribution rate to the unemployment insurance system is assumed to
evolve proportional to the unemployment rate underlying our labor market projections. The
respective rate decreases from currently 6.5 percent to 2.3 percent in 2050 in our benchmark
scenario – an order of magnitude last reached in 1977. Contribution rates to health and long-
term are assumed to remain constant at their current levels of 13.8 and 1.7 percent. The tax
rate on wage income is initially set to 16 percent but increases proportional to government
grants to the pension system.
14
We initially normalize the current pension value,  t φ , such that the replacement rate is equal to
the current value of 70.4 percent (year 2000). Furthermore, we set the ratio of administrative
expenditures to total pension payments to 1.8 percent (as it was in 2000). Solving out equa-
tion (1) for the ratio of government grants to overall contributions yields a ratio of 35.7 per-
cent which implies an implicit tax rate on income of 6.9 percent −  a bit less than the earlier
noted 9 percent. Our model thus slightly underestimates overall expenditures of the German
pension system. This minor error, however, does not much affect our predictions. For the
simulations we assume that the ratio of government grants to total contributions remains con-
stant such that the amount of government grants relative to work income increases over time
                                               
13 However, we assume that mortality and fertility of immigrants differ from natives in the demographic model
(see section 2).
14 We do not carry out a sensitivity analysis with regard to these assumptions. See e.g. Sinn and Thum (1999) for
a detailed analysis on how assumptions on other taxes affect predictions of the PAYG system contribution rate in
a partial equilibrium framework.15
if the direct contribution rate to the PAYG pension system increases. As noted before, we do
not model any form of indirect taxation. Therefore, such a relative increase of government
grants yields to an increase in the tax rate on wage income. For the backward solution of the
model until 1960, we use the social security contribution rates observed in the past and solve
out equation (1) for the replacement rate. This results in an average replacement rate for Ger-
many of about 72 percent which is only slightly higher than the observed value.
Further parameters of the model are the household’s preference parameters, the parameters of
the production function and values for the age-specific productivity profile. For the latter, we
apply estimates for Germany presented in Fitzenberger et al. (2001). These authors use data
from the West German Beschäftigungsstatistik of the Federal Employment Service to separate
the evolution of wages into a life-cycle wage profile independently of the calendar year and a
macroeconomic time trend for four different education groups. We employ their estimated
age-wage-profiles and weight them with the respective shares of each education group taken
from the German Income and Expenditure Survey 1993 (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstich-
probe). This provides us with a representative age-wage profile that peaks at the age of 52 and
then decreases slightly.
Our choice of benchmark calibration parameters for the production function are concordant
with parameter estimates for Germany by Börsch-Supan (1995). The estimate of the share of
capital used in production is 0.4099 and the estimate of the substitution elasticity between
capital and labor is 0.999. We therefore take 0.4 and 1 as benchmark values respectively, i.e.
we initially assume a Cobb-Douglas production function. The capital share is relatively high –
given a narrow concept of capital without human capital – and usual values for the elasticity
of substitution range from 0.8 to 1 (compare e.g. Altig et al., 2001). We therefore consider a
range from 0.3 to 0.4 for α  and a range from 0.8 to 1 for β  in the sensitivity analysis, both
producing lower estimates of the return to capital than our benchmark values. For g, the
growth rate of labor augmenting technical change, we use 1 percent per year as in other OLG
models such as Altig et al., 2001). This is a conservative estimate of future growth and at the
lower bound of parameter values employed in the literature: Cutler et al. (1990) suggest 1.4
percent whereas Pemberton (1999) uses 2 percent. We therefore apply a range from 1 to 2
percent in the sensitivity analysis. The average depreciation rate of capital was 0.0528 in
Germany from 1960 to 1990. We therefore use 0.05 throughout all the scenarios. The re-
maining parameter is A, the aggregate efficiency parameter in the production function. We
adjust A twice, first in 1990 when we solve the model prior to the German reunification em-
ploying equation (4) and GDP data for Germany. We then solve At = At-1(1+g) backward until16
1960 and forward until 2200 which is consistent with our deterministic model. We readjust A
after the reunification in 2000 and again solve At = At-1(1+g) backward until 1991 and for-
ward until 2200.
An often applied value for the discount rate of households is 0.011 based on an estimate by
Hurd (1989). We use 0.01 as a benchmark value and apply a range from 0.01 to 0.03 in the
sensitivity analysis. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is usually chosen to lie in be-
tween 2 and 4. We consider this range in the sensitivity analysis and use 2.7 as a benchmark
value – less than the mean of the range we consider in the sensitivity analysis in order to
achieve reasonable values for the capital to output ratio. The parameter values used in the
calibration of our model are summarized in table 7.
Given the benchmark calibration parameters, the model performs well in matching the em-
pirical counterparts of the capital to output ratio over the period 1960-1990. The empirical av-
erage of the capital to output ratio is 2.604, our model predicts 2.609. We somewhat overes-
timate the return to capital and underestimate the savings rate of households. The savings rate
of households predicted in our model is around 4.5 percent while the empirical value in-
creased from 4.35 percent in 1960 to about 12 percent in 2000. In our model of perfect fore-
sight, there is no role for uncertainty and thus the predicted rate of return to capital should be
scaled to the rate of return to risk-free assets. We use 4.5 percent in 2000 as a reasonable es-
timate of a risk-free rate of return.
4. Simulation results
We begin our presentation of simulation results with the contribution and replacement rates
under the three pension system scenarios described in section 2. The comprehensive contribu-
tion rate – a more meaningful concept than the direct contribution rate – is initially at 28 per-
cent. It is predicted to increase to about 42.1 percent by 2050 if the current generous replace-
ment rates were maintained, see figure 3. This implies an increase of the tax rate on wage in-
come from currently 16 percent to 19.7 percent and a direct contribution rate of about 29.7
percent in 2050.
Figure 3 also shows the evolution of the contribution rate to the PAYG pillar under the Ri-
ester reform scheme. We arrive at contribution rates that are somewhat less optimistic than
those calculated by the German government which uses more optimistic population and labor
force scenarios. The difference between the comprehensive contribution rate under the pure
PAYG system and the Riester reform scheme is 2.7 percentage points in 2050. Both results17
are in line with the findings by Schnabel (2001). By definition, the contribution rate in the
“freezing reform” scenario is constant at 28 percent after the implementation of the reform
scheme.
Figure 4 plots the net replacement rates associated with the different pension reform scenar-
ios. As the figure indicates, the replacement rate under the pure PAYG system is predicted to
remain almost constant at the current level. The freezing reform however would lead to a sig-
nificant reduction of pensions provided by the public pension system – the replacement rate
will be reduced by about 30 percentage points relative to maintaining a pure PAYG pension
system. The replacement rate under the Riester reform lies in between and arrives at a still
rather generous level: the net replacement rate decreases by about 6.7 percentage points rela-
tive to the pure PAYG pension system.
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We now present the results of our macroeconomic simulation model. To separate the direct
effect of population aging on capital markets from potential feedback effects through pension
reform, we first present projections under the counterfactual assumption of an unchanged pen-
sion system (isolating the population aging effect) and then add the two pension reform sce-
narios described in section 2.
We begin by looking at the aggregate savings rate, defined as household savings as a percent-
age of disposable income. Figure 5 shows that the projected aggregate savings rates decline
substantially due to aging. For example, in the year 2038, when the peak of the aging problem
occurs, the savings rate is projected to be substantially negative at -2 percent under the pure
PAYG system. The difference between the projected peak of the savings rate that will be
reached in year 2015 and the trough in 2035 is about 9.2 percentage points. Savings under a
very fundamental pension reform – the freezing reform – would be substantially higher than
under the present system. The overall difference in the aggregate savings rate between the
freezing reform system and the present system would be 1.4 percentage points in 2050. This
shows that optimal life-cycle behavior generates additional savings under a fundamental pen-
sion reform. Our model therefore shows that additional retirement saving induced by a pen-
sion reform does not crowd out other saving totally, as is sometimes claimed. The Riester re-
form will only marginally change household’s optimal savings behavior. This result is due to
the small impact of the Riester reform on contributions to the public pension system and the
pension level (see figures 3 and 4).18
Next, we aggregate savings to obtain the economy’s capital stock. Figure 6 shows projections
of the total capital stock for alternative pension schemes. Since crowding out is only partial,
the extra savings induced by both reform schemes result in a higher long-term capital stock.
Figure 6 also shows how misplaced the notion of an “asset meltdown” actually is. While sav-
ing rates decline sharply during the peak of the aging process and the capital stock does de-
crease between the years 2030 and 2045 under all pension systems, the size of this decline is
small. Moreover, as soon as the projected old age dependency ratio becomes roughly stable,
the effect of technological progress dominates the demographic effects and the capital stock
increases again. The projected maximum decrease of the capital stock – between 2030 and
2043 under the pure PAYG pension system – is about 5.5 percent.
The projected time path of the capital stock shown in figure 6 has several implications. First,
the magnitude of accumulated new savings under the freezing reform scheme is manageable,
relative to the current capital stock. The long run value (year 2050) represents about 16 per-
cent of the current (year 2000) capital stock under the freezing reform and 4 percent under the
Riester reform. It is about equal to today’s value of life insurance savings and occupational
pensions. Second, compared to the pure PAYG system scenario, there is less decline in the
capital stock between the years 2030 to 2045 when the baby boomers retire because the baby
boom retirement entry stretches about 10 years during which the pre-funded component has
not yet matured. The continued increase in new funded-pillar pension accounts compensates
dissaving among the retired baby boomers.
Population aging leads to a dramatic increase of the capital-labor ratio. It is exacerbated by
the two pension reforms. This increase translates into a reduced return to capital. This is de-
picted in figure 7. The decrease in the return to capital due to population aging is projected to
be around 0.7 percentage points from year 2000 to year 2028. Relative to this population ag-
ing effect, the additional decrease in the rate of return due to the Riester pension reform is
only marginal. Under the more radical freezing reform this additional decrease would amount
to some 0.5 percentage points. These effects are much smaller than often claimed in the public
debate. They reflect the small decrease in the capital stock when the baby boomers retire. The
main reason for the difference to the “meltdown” projections are the equilibrium effects mod-
eled in our overlapping generation model. Saving rates adjust to demographic changes, and
they rebound after the trough around 2040, when the demographic changes slow down.
                                                                                                                                                  
15 The reader is reminded of our definition of the replacement rate, which −  unlike the current government’s
definition −  preserves comparability under the various pension reform schemes. See section 2.19
Before turning to the sensitivity of our results, it is worth noting that these estimates are based
on a closed-economy model. International diversification will further reduce the decrease in
the rate of return since international capital mobility will diversify the demographic shock.
We will discuss this briefly in the concluding section.
5. Sensitivity analysis
How do the core results of our analysis – a rather muted response of the aggregate saving rate
and the rate of return to population aging, and an even smaller additional effect of pension re-
form on these two variables – stand up when key parameters and assumptions of our simula-
tion model are changed?
Our sensitivity analysis is carried out along two dimensions: varying the underlying demo-
graphic and labor force projections, and varying the key parameters of the OLG model. Re-
garding the first dimension, we project savings and returns under all possible combinations of
labor force and population scenarios, keeping all other parameters of the model fixed. Since
we consider three of each of these scenarios, this provides us with a total of nine combina-
tions.
In terms of the second dimension, we combine three values – the mean, the maximum and the
minimum (see table 7) – of five key model parameters (the share of capital, the rate of sub-
stitution between capital and labor, the rate of technological progress, the coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion, and the discount rate). In this exercise, we keep the population and labor
force scenario at its benchmark values. This exercise provides us with 243 combinations.
We then compute the mean, median, minimum and maximum of the impacts of population
aging and pension reform on the aggregate savings rate and the rate of return. The results are
presented in tables 8 and 9. Note that treating the 9 and 243 combinations, respectively, with
equal weight when computing means and medians deviates from the conventional approach
where the benchmark scenarios and parameters are given a higher weight.
16
Some summary statistics of the first exercise – the sensitivity analysis regarding alternative
population and labor force scenarios – are given in table 8. Since the benchmark scenario is
the median scenario of the combination of nine scenarios, the results of our benchmark cal-
culations are close to the mean and median of the combination of all scenarios. Note that the
minimum and maximum of the respective values are reached under the extreme scenarios. For
                                               
16 See e.g. Altig et al., 2001 for what is referred to as “the conventional approach” in the text.20
example, the projected maximum decrease in the rate of return to capital of 0.7 percentage
points between the freezing reform and the pure PAYG system occurs in the combination of
the strong aging population scenario with a weak increase in the labor force – a fairly unreal-
istic scenario. And even under this assumption, the effect remains small.
Next, we turn to the sensitivity analysis with regard to the calibration parameters. As table 9
indicates, the projected decrease in the savings rate due to population aging is higher in the
benchmark scenario relative to the mean (median) of the sensitivity analysis. This is due to
the fact that our benchmark values for the share of capital used in the production function and
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor are at the upper bound and the discount
rate of households is at the lower bound of the range of calibration parameters used in the sen-
sitivity analysis. All three changes of these parameters in the sensitivity analysis relative to
the benchmark – a decrease of α  and β  and an increase in ρ  – lead to a decrease in savings.
The positive effect on savings caused by an increase in g, the growth rate of the productivity
parameter, is not strong enough to offset this decrease on average. It follows that the average
capital stock obtained in the sensitivity analysis is lower and that therefore the return to capi-
tal is higher. Table 9 also shows that the increase in savings due to a fundamental pension re-
form is on average lower than the increase in our benchmark scenario. Due to decreasing re-
turns of scale, this smaller mean increase in savings relative to the benchmark leads to a
higher reduction in the rate of return to capital. However, the maximum projected decrease in
the rate of return to capital under the freezing reform scenario is still rather low at about 0.9
percentage points, while the mean is about 0.6 percentage points.
Along both dimensions – demographic and labor force scenarios on the one hand, and key
model parameters on the other hand – the sensitivity analysis has therefore provided substan-
tial confidence in the stability of the conclusions which we have drawn at the end of the pre-
ceding section.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the consequences of population aging and fundamental pen-
sion reform – that is, a shift towards more pre-funding of pension benefits – for capital mar-
kets in Germany, focusing on savings and the rate of return. A transition to a partially funded
system results initially in a higher capital stock. When the baby boom generations begin to
consume their retirement savings, the capital stock decreases. Our simulations suggest that the21
resulting decrease in the rate of return is not negligible, but it is much smaller than often
claimed in the public debate.
Moreover, there are two mechanisms that suggest that the estimates of the decrease in the rate
of return due to population aging and fundamental pension reform derived from our model
represent an upper bound. First, the model presented in this paper assumes that Germany is a
closed economy. This is a counterfactual assumption, and the return to capital can be im-
proved by international diversification. While the patterns of population aging are similar in
most countries, the timing differs substantially, in particular between industrialized and less
developed countries. Among others, Pemberton (1999), Reisen (2000), and Börsch-Supan et
al. (2002) show that in a more realistic open-economy scenario, these differences in popula-
tion aging generate international capital flows that moderate our rate-of-return predictions
even further. Closed-economy models of pension reform exaggerate both the effects of popu-
lation aging and the feedback effects of pension reform on capital markets.
Second, there may be additional feedback effects associated with strengthened capital markets
through pension reforms that our fixed production structure given by equation (4) misses. It
has been argued that as pension funds become more important in households’ portfolios, eq-
uity culture in Germany will improve, both deepening and broadening capital markets and
possibly strengthening corporate governance (see Deutsche Bank Research, 1996). The un-
derlying mechanisms are discussed in detail by Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001). They start
from the observation that few households in Germany hold financial assets with at least some
minimal ownership rights. These assets are highly concentrated among few households, in
stark contrast to countries in which a substantial share of retirement income is financed
through pension funds. A lack of relatively actively managed pension funds contributes to a
financial system with diffuse control structures and weak corporate governance, which in turn
results in low capital productivity relative to other countries. Pension reform towards a higher
degree of pre-funding can therefore strengthen corporate governance, increase capital produc-
tivity at constant or even increasing levels of labor productivity, and increase total factor pro-
ductivity. Even if such productivity effects of pension reform are small, Börsch-Supan and
Winter argue that they change the growth path of an economy and therefore have large effects
in the long run, strengthening savings and further reducing the “meltdown” effect.
To conclude this paper, a few remarks on the economic model we used to simulate the macro-
economic effects of a fundamental pension reform are in order. We have already mentioned
that our overlapping-generations model is stylized. Some important economic mechanisms are22
not taken into account, most importantly, endogenous labor supply decisions and taxation.
While it would be interesting to explore these issues in our model, we do not anticipate that
they would change the basic message of our analysis. In addition, our sensitivity analysis with
respect to labor market scenarios covers a wide range of potential endogenous labor market
reactions.
At a more fundamental level, while the framework of rational, forward-looking life-cycle de-
cisions is a convenient and broadly accepted tool for the analysis of the effects of pension re-
forms and other public policy measures, the underlying assumption of rational behavior has
been criticized as being unrealistic. In many applications, one might ignore this problem by
following an as if argument. For example, Rodepeter and Winter (1999) argue that simple
rules of thumb might help individuals to achieve savings outcomes that are quite similar to the
solution of the intertemporal optimization problem. Another problem might arise when indi-
viduals suffer from a lack of self-control: They might not be able to make time-consistent
savings decisions that allow them to attain their desired levels of retirement wealth
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Diamond and Köszegi, 1999).
It is difficult to quantify the importance of deviations from the rationality assumption, in par-
ticular in an OLG model. If anything, we would argue that in Germany, in contrast to the
United States, people have saved too much for retirement rather than too little (see Börsch-
Supan et al., 2001), and undersaving due to time-inconsistent preferences has not been a
problem in the past. Also, recent polls by Boeri et al. (2001) suggest that people are well
aware of the need to save for their retirement. In any case, it should be clear that a fundamen-
tal pension reform needs to provide appropriate incentives that ensure that individuals save
enough to close the future pensions gap, and that individuals invest their retirement savings
wisely. Providing retirement savings products that facilitate such decisions and allow for self-
commitment is an important task for insurance companies and banks, but there is no reason to
believe that this cannot be achieved by the market sector. The 2001 pension reform in Ger-
many provides such products, but it remains to be seen whether the incentives are strong
enough to generate sufficient new saving; Börsch-Supan (2002) discusses this issue further.
Another aspect which is not reflected in our overlapping generations model is financial mar-
kets risk. Our analysis concentrated on the long-term path of the rate of return to capital in a
model with no stochastic aggregate fluctuations, so there was no role for risk. Real-world in-
vestments are risky, and in their savings and portfolio decisions, households are concerned
not only about the (expected) rate of return, but also about its variance, that is, about portfolio23
risk. However, it is important to note that the average rates of return to capital projected in
this paper are much lower than the rates of return to equity experienced on stock markets in
the last few years. It is certainly not necessary that stock market valuations of productive
capital grow at such rates to sustain a funded pension system. Even a considerable drop in the
stock market relative to the record levels seen in the spring of 2000 would not jeopardize
long-run average rates of return. Diamond (1999) and Poterba (2001) provide overviews of
this issue and discuss what average rates of return might be expected in the future; these are in
line with the results we obtained from our simulations.
Future research should incorporate risk aspects into OLG models such as the one we pre-
sented in this paper. Brooks (2000) provides an example. While his results, based on stylized
demographic assumptions of an aging economy, are difficult to compare with our results
which are based on realistic demographic projections and detailed reform proposals, the inter-
est rate effects he obtains are in the same order of magnitude as the ones we report in this pa-
per. Brooks reports that during the initial phase of demographic transition, when the baby
boomers save more and drive the capital stock up, the expected rate of return to capital rises
above its steady-state level by ten base points, while the risk-free rate is 23 base points higher.
When the baby boomers get old and dissave, the rate of return to capital falls by ten base
points, and the risk-free rate by 24 base points, below their steady-state levels.
The risk aspect of pension reform has generated strong statements. Burtless (2000) concludes
his study of social security privatization and financial markets risks by taking an extreme po-
sition: “Because public social security is backed by taxing and borrowing authority of the
state, it can spread risks over a much larger population ..., including contributors and benefici-
aries in several generations.” We do not think that this statement can be backed by a formal
analysis. Exact welfare comparisons in stochastic overlapping generations models that allow
for (idiosyncratic or aggregate) risk are conceptually quite difficult (see Sargent, 1999), and
they need to take account of the nature of risks involved, including the various risks inherent
in pensions based on policy decisions.
17 Moreover, one should not forget what is at stake.
Given the severity of the population aging problem that lies ahead, the “tax and borrow” ap-
proach to reforming social security is just not feasible for a country aging as deeply as Ger-
many. The political strain caused by the degree of intergenerational redistribution (and the as-
sociated tax rates) required for sustaining the existing pay-as-you-go system is likely to out-24
weigh the benefits of mandated intergenerational risk sharing by far. While more research is
needed on the risk aspects of a fundamental pension reform, our analysis suggests that the rate
of return to capital can sustain such reforms.
                                                                                                                                                  
17 Miles and Timmermann (1999), Bohn (1999), Shiller (1999), Storesletten et al. (1999), and Rangel and Zeck-
hauser (1999) provide formal analyses of institutional arrangements for intragenerational, intergenerational, and
international risk sharing.25
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1994/1996 73 79.5 70.3 77.9 80.3 85.2
2080
Scenario 1
79 85 79 85 81 87
1994/1996 73 79.5 70.3 77.9 80.3 85.2
2080
Scenario 2
81 87 81 87 81 87
1994/1996 73 79.5 70.3 77.9 80.3 85.2
2080
Scenario 3
83 89 83 89 81 87
Note: A more detailed description of the transition paths is given in Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
Source: Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
Table 2: Assumptions on the total fertility rate in the demographic model
Year Natives - West Natives - East Immigrants – West Immigrants – East
1998 1.35 1.12 1.9 1.55
2040 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
Note: A more detailed description of the transition paths is given in Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
Source: Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
Table 3: Assumptions on net migration in the demographic model
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1998 + 47,098 + 47,098 + 47,098
since 2002 / 2005 + 22,064 + 120,000 + 219,069
Note: A more detailed description of the transition paths is given in Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
Source: Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).
Table 4: Assumptions on decreases in unemployment
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
2000 10 % 10 % 10 %
2030 7 % 5 % 4 %
Table 5: Assumptions on the mean retirement age
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
2000 60 60 60
2050 60 63 6529
Table 6: Assumptions on an adjustment of labor force participation rates by 2050
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Women to Men 0 0.6 0.9
East to West 0 1 1
Immigrants to Natives 0 0.15 0.5
Note: The difference between the age-specific labor force participation rates is reduced by the factor
given in the table. A more detailed description of the procedure is given in Ludwig (2002).
Table 7: Calibration of parameters in the overlapping generations model
Calibration parameter Benchmark values Sensitivity analysis
α : output share of capital in the CES production
function
0.4 0.3 – 0.4
β : elasticity of substitution in the CES production
function
1 0.8 – 1
g: growth rate of labor augmenting technical
change
0.015 0.01 – 0.02
δ : depreciation rate of capital 0.05 0.05
ρ : rate of time preference 0.01 0.01 – 0.03
σ : coefficient of relative risk aversion 2.7 2 – 4
Table 8: Sensitivity with regard to population and labor force scenarios
Difference in... Benchmark Sensitivity analysis
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
S/Y under CS -0.092 -0.092 - 0.092 -0.105 -0.078
r under CS -0.0067 -0.0072 -0.0067 -0.0107 -0.0044
S/Y between
FR and CS 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.006 0.029
r between FR
and CS -0.0047 -0.005 -0.0047 -0.0076 -0.003
S/Y between RI
and CS 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0014 0.0033
r between RI
and CS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0013 -0.0009
Note: S/Y: savings rate, r: rate of return to capital, CS: pure PAYG system, FR: freezing model, RI:
Riester reform. The differences between the savings rate and the rate of return to capital in the pure
PAYG system are the effects of population aging and give the differences in the respective rates be-
tween the peak in about 2015 and the trough in about 2035. The differences in the respective rates
between the pension systems are evaluated in 2050.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).30
Table 9: Sensitivity with regard to the calibration parameters
Difference in... Benchmark Sensitivity analysis
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
S/Y under CS -0.092 -0.068 -0.067 -0.097 -0.051
r under CS -0.0067 -0.0066 -0.006 -0.011 -0.0036
S/Y between
FR and CS 0.013 0.0096 0.0095 0.0064 0.014
r between FR
and CS -0.0047 -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.009 -0.0038
S/Y between RI
and CS 0.002 0.0014 0.0014 0.0009 0.002
r between RI
and CS -0.001 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.002 -0.0008
Note: S/Y: savings rate, r: rate of return to capital, CS: pure PAYG system, FR: freezing model, RI:
Riester reform. The differences between the savings rate and the rate of return to capital in the pure
PAYG system are the effects of population aging and give the differences in the respective rates be-
tween the peak in about 2015 and the trough in about 2035. The differences in the respective rates
between the pension systems are evaluated in 2050.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999).31
Figure 1: Projections of the old-age dependency ratio












































Notes: This figure shows projections of the number of  persons older than 65 as a percentage
of the working age population for three demographic scenarios.
Source:  Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999).32
Figure 2: Projections of the economic dependency ratio






































weak population aging / strong increase of labor force
modest population aging / modest increase of labor force
strong population aging / weak increase of labor force
Notes: This figure shows projections of the number of pensioners as a percentage of the num-
ber of workers for combinations of demographic and labor force scenarios.
Source:  Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999).33
Figure 3: Projections of the comprehensive contribution rate to the public pension system
under alternative pension systems













































Notes: This figure shows projections of the comprehensive contribution rate to the public
pensions system derived under benchmark assumptions for demographic change and the de-
velopment of the labor force and alternative pension systems.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999).34
Figure 4: Projections of the replacement rate of the public pension system under alternative
pension systems


































Notes: This figure shows projections of the comprehensive contribution rate to the public
pensions system derived under benchmark assumptions for demographic change and the de-
velopment of the labor force and alternative pension systems.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999).35
Figure 5: Projections of the aggregate saving rate under alternative pension systems
































Notes: This figure shows projections of the aggregate saving rate derived from an overlapping
generations model under benchmark assumptions for demographic change and the develop-
ment of the labor force and alternative pension systems.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999).36
Figure 6: Projections of the aggregate capital stock under alternative pension systems














































Notes: This figure shows projections of the aggregate capital stock derived from an overlap-
ping generations model under benchmark assumptions for demographic change and the de-
velopment of the labor force and alternative pension systems.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999).37
Figure 7: Projections of the rate of return to capital under alternative pension systems




























Notes: This figure shows projections of the rate of return to capital derived from an overlap-
ping generations model under benchmark assumptions for demographic change and the de-
velopment of the labor force and alternative pension systems.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
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